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TRAVELING CONCEPTS: SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY
ON THE ROAD
Susanne Baer*
Ideas travel. Even legal concepts migrate on the globe. However, it is a contested
issue whether migration is a good idea. We may enjoy traveling ourselves, but many
people in the world of law are somewhat worried if we take legal baggage along. Some
claim that legal baggage never arrives at its destination and challenge the very possibility
of what some call a legal transplant. Others claim that we already live in transnational
legal contexts, while still others claim that migration occurs, and that modifies each legal
concept on the road in rather significant ways, which may render the project futile. Yet
others, albeit few indeed, but influential when sitting on the U.S. Supreme Court, simply
do not want law to travel, whether it would work or not, and defend some version of
parochial nationalism. Before we argue whether travelling concepts in law are a good
idea or not, we should know what exactly happens when law hits the road. We need a
concept to analyze how law travels.
I will discuss several candidates for this concept which has been developed in
comparative legal studies, as well as in studies of international relations and other fields
of political science and will apply these to a specific legal idea, substantive equality, as
conceived, communicated and litigated by Catharine MacKinnon. The factors already
identified which allow for legal ideas to move beyond the nation-state, including
networks of people, institutional and symbolic structures, knowledge-creation strategies,
and strategies of government (or more precisely: law makers) do not, as I will
demonstrate, sufficiently explain what happened to MacKinnon's idea on the road.
Therefore, I propose to add a quality factor to norm diffusion theories. I argue that a
specific quality of a legal idea contributes significantly to its travelling abilities. With
this, I modify concepts of norm diffusion by adding what I take to be a distinctly legal
aspect. In short, political science must take the specificities of the law more seriously.
Hopefully, this addition to norm diffusion analysis also further illuminates the very
nature of the idea MacKinnon applies to inequalities around the globe. I do assume we
are in need of such enlightenment, since this is a theory which has been fought,
denounced, ignored, or misread, or, the petty case, has been claimed without citation.
* Professor of Public Law and Gender Studies, Faculty of Law, Humboldt University of Berlin
(Germany); James W. Cook Global Law Professor, University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor (US);
Visiting Professor, Department of Legal Studies, CEU Budapest (Hungary), since 2011 Justice of the Federal
Constitutional Court of Germany. For more information, see <http://baer.rewi.hu-berlin.de/>. I am grateful to
the University of Tulsa College of Law for hosting us at the symposium, and allowing for such an exchange,
and to Catharine MacKinnon, for information on itineraries, as a colleague and friend.
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Therefore, a systematic analysis of what happened will add to a genealogy of feminist
legal ideas and feminist lawyering, which is otherwise often obscured, appropriated,
obliterated or distorted in the course of events.
This analysis is not a view from a scholarly distance born out of sheer curiosity, as
I believe is the case with very few studies anyways. Here, the study is driven by a
commitment to comparative constitutionalism and fundamental rights and by a
dedication to support interdisciplinary, or what I prefer to call critical, studies in the
sense of reflexive legal studies. But in addition, I have worked with Catharine
MacKinnon, on and off, for more than twenty years. This has been, and continues to be,
a truly inspiring and challenging, thus multifaceted encounter. As a scholar based in
Germany and more broadly, Europe, but a recurring visitor to the United States, it is also
an experience in how an idea travels in a national context. Initially greeted with polite
curiosity for the foreigner, I have had many conversations in the United States come to
an abrupt halt when I referred to this collaboration and, not least, this friendship. Many
U.S. colleagues put me in the trenches with the one who they constructed as the enemy
and, turning away, stopped talking. Soon I learned to tell people what I think first, and
then uncover one great source of this way of thinking later. It seems harder to then
simply walk away just because a name came up, but it still happens.
In the United States, this polarization has not suited feminism, or any other critical
approach to law well. To stop a conversation, to personalize, to demonize, or to glorify,
as the other side of the coin, is never a good idea, and often indicates bad scholarship on
the side of the speaker too. Therefore, the following is also meant to bridge some gaps
people may falsely associate with MacKinnon's work. I hope that this attempt to tell a
story of how an idea travels beyond national boundaries may thus also inspire a
reconsideration of how an idea travels within a nation. Luckily, others, and Kimberl6
Crenshaw is the first who comes to mind,l build bridges which allow for such
movements, reconciling feminist and antiracist theory and politics which have in fact
been a joint force from the beginning. And if we want to understand what allows and
what stops ideas from such travels, we can use the concepts designed to understand
transnational norm diffusion, which I will do just now.
In what follows, I discuss how Catharine MacKinnon's ideas have travelled as a
case study based on legal material and some conversations with people who have been
involved.2 I seek to understand the factors which ease or hinder such travelling of legal
ideas and will discuss several approaches to the issue. Some are used in comparative law
- transplants, transnational law, migration - while more holistic understandings have
been developed in political science, as in studies of international relations, multi-level
governance, and, more recently, transnational interaction in transnational policy
networks. These are norm diffusion theories. In particular, and with a noteworthy choice
of topic, we have insightful case studies of transnational feminism.3 In addition, gender
1. See KimberlM Crenshaw, Close Encounters of Three Kinds: On Teaching Dominance Feminism and
Intersectionality, 46 TULSA L. REV. 151.
2. So much said, this is not a systematic empirical study of all the material that one could find. Rather, this
article charts the way for such a study, to discuss the concepts of norm diffusion.
3. Transnational feminism is the term intentionally used to avoid the trap of "global feminism." See
Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourse, 30 FEMINIST
Vol. 46:5960
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studies and postcolonial studies allow us to understand knowledge politics that inform
such processes, and they are not new either. When combined, norm diffusion theory and
such critical approaches offer a rich analytical matrix. Here, I focus on the addition of the
legal quality factor. Some work does hint that the very nature of legal ideas has an
impact, but there is, to my knowledge, no full-fledged analytical discussion to understand
this yet. So what is this quality?
One would think it is substantive equality, sometimes called dominance theory, or
subordination, or asymmetrical, depending. Yet I propose that MacKinnon's concept of
law reaches deeper than that, to the classic idea which I call radical deconstruction of the
public-private ideology. It is as foundational to modem law, liberal fundamentals, and
human rights as it is a cornerstone of racism and sexism. Substantive equality A la
MacKinnon tackles just that, and this is what she takes beyond the national context, to
additional, namely transnational levels. Based on some hesitation to endorse post-
modem theory, she would not call it that. But deconstruction, taken seriously, can too be
stripped of its depoliticizing pop versions and be used as the radical call for a thorough
analysis and reworking of ideologies. Not that reworking the public-private ideology is a
new undertaking. One could even argue that radical feminism employed deconstruction
as a method before the philosophical and literary studies brand name came along.
Whatever we call it, such deconstruction allows for a critical approach to politics,
including law, again, in its most reflexive sense.
ITINERARIES
Look at the facts first. MacKinnon's ideas travel. Many examples exist to illustrate
this point: sexual harassment, pornography, prostitution, rape, gender crime, and the
underlying idea of substantive equality.
As one prominent example, the concept of sexual harassment, presented in 19794
as a violation of equal rights, made it to the EU. Early in the 1990s, Catharine
MacKinnon advised the European Commission on policies against sexual harassment,
which at the time did not exist on the level of the EU nor in most member states.
However, European efforts to conceptualize sexual harassment as an inequality were not
successful at the beginning. The EU, like many other actors, conceived harassment, both
on the ground and in a legislative capacity, as an excessive, immoral, distasteful
exception to regular interaction at the workplace and tied it to dignity only. 5 Only later,
REV. 61, 63-4 (1988). See also INDERPAL GREWAL, HOME AND HAREM: NATION, GENDER, EMPIRE AND THE
CULTURES OF TRAVEL (1996). For a seminal study, see Jacqui True & Michael Mintrom, Transnational
Networks and Policy Diffusion: The Case of Gender Mainstreaming, 45 INT'L STUD. Q. 27 (2001). For a
historical account, see NITZA BERKOVITCH, FROM MOTHERHOOD TO CITIZENSHIP: WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (1999).
4. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION (1979) (consistent analysis of harassment in contexts of gendered employment segregation as
sex discrimination in U.S. law). Note that MacKinnon calls sexual harassment the "first legal wrong to be
defined by women," not by her. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment: The First Five Years, in
WOMEN'S LIVES - MEN'S LAWS 111, 111 (2005). It is inappropriate to discard that as rhetorics if there is
empirical data behind such statements.
5. The development is analyzed in the excellent comparative study by Kathrin S. Zippel in THE POLITICS
OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 86-7 (2006), who describes sexual harassment law as an import from the United
States. I discuss problems attached to the dignity approach in Susanne Baer, Dignity or Equality? Responses to
2010 61
TULSA LAW REVIEW
in the wake of more consistent equality legislation around the year 2000, was harassment
firmly established as a violation of equal rights. In today's EU law, harassment is framed
in equality law as an inequality (in the section on the "Concept of Discrimination"), and
described in forms of individual violations of dignity and a hostile work environment. 6
As another example, the idea that pornography is a violation of civil rights and not
of morals has made it not only to Minneapolis, where the city commissioned MacKinnon
and long-time collaborator Andrea Dworkin to draft an ordinance against pornography in
1983, and Indianapolis, where it was passed and litigated, but also travelled to several
countries abroad. There is Canadian jurisprudence that MacKinnon was involved in as an
expert adviser to a strategic litigation body, LEAF.7 However, because one later
Canadian decision dealt with gay and lesbian pornography, MacKinnon's work has
been falsely denounced as anti-gay, beyond anti-sex. Some would therefore tell the story
of how her ideas travel as a story of discrimination, here, regarding sexual orientation.
This is false and it is also based on an overly broad concept of norm diffusion. Following
MacKinnon's equality analysis and her take on gender, the key point which was taken up
in the Canadian decision is that pornography which harms people may be banned
regardless of whether the people displayed or the audience targeted or the actual users
are and appear to be gay or lesbian or heterosexual or anything else, because gender and
sex are constructed, as I would call it, in contexts of heteronormativity. This is not
discriminatory but equality without caveats for anyone. Certainly, equality also means
that law enforcement cannot discriminate against gay or lesbian bookstores.
Regarding norm diffusion, it is also problematic to attach anything that happens in
a given context to some initial impulse. Law enforcement activities are very often not in
line with legal concepts or leading jurisprudence. To blame a problematic practice on a
person with a particular argument, at an earlier point in time, demonizes the person, but
is not an adequate account of the facts. Thus, it is superficial, and ultimately false to
identify all later practices with the idea, a challenge we return to in our discussion of
norm diffusion.
Then, there is also the German experience, in which I literally, after a few hours
Workplace Harassment in European, German, and U.S. Law, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
582, 582-601 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva Siegel eds., 2003).
6. Council Directive 2000/78, art. 2, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 2, 12 (EC). ("Harassment shall be deemed to be a
form of discrimination within the meaning of paragraph 1, when unwanted conduct related to any of the
grounds referred to in Article 1 takes place with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person and of
creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. In this context, the concept
of harassment may be defined in accordance with the national laws and practice of the Member States.")
7. The prime example is the decision against hate speech of the Canadian Supreme Court in R v. Keegstra,
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.), as well as the pornography decision on R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (Can.),
informed by LEAF, at a time when MacKinnon was part of the Legal Committee, which Kathleen Mahoney
argued. For further discussion, see Sheila McIntyre, Timely Interventions: MacKinnon's Contribution to
Canadian Equality Jurisprudence, 46 TULSA L. REV. 81.
8. The controversial case is Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium v. Can. (Can.), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120, in
which Janine Benedet intervened with equality arguments. LEAF took the position of the defendants. For
MacKinnon's position, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 146, 146-62 (1987). See also CHRISTOPHER N. KENDALL, GAY MALE
PORNOGRAPHY: AN ISSUE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (2004) (additional discussion of gay pornography and the
Canadian Case). Certainly, there is also a mass of mainstream literature that defends pornography, often in the
name of (which?) "women" or (whose?) "liberty."
9. See Susanne Baer, Pornography and Sexual Harassment in the EU, in SEXUAL POLITICS AND THE
62 Vol. 46:59
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of conversation, took the pile of testimony collected in the Minneapolis hearings back
home, went through the material, studied the German situation, and sat down to draft a
national civil rights ordinance (a concept not known as such in continental civil law, and
used again in 2000 in the German domestic violence bill). It was then picked up (and
also distorted, in my opinion) by a famous German feminist journalist, and it both failed
in national parliament and fueled discussion in a "PorNO"-campaign all over the
country. Is this norm diffusion, or simply a failed legislative attempt? I will argue that a
concept of travelling in law needs to catch that too.
Yet another example of MacKinnon's idea on the road is an understanding of
prostitution as a violation of fundamental human rights. According to MacKinnon's
position, prostitution is not self-determination or agency or something some call sex-
work or the "oldest trade" or a market. Rather, prostitution is an instance of a wide range
of abuses based on sex, not in relation to gender, but doing gender.10 MacKinnon argues
that prostitution is not conceptually different from trafficking, and this argument ties well
into international policy debates in which trafficking, particularly enslaved women
shipped across nation-state borders, is an urgent matter within the fight against organized
crime. One may then say that MacKinnon's concept captures the travelling character of
the very problem, and, accordingly, the concept travels too. But one must add that the
concept of prostitution as sex discrimination also informs some national policies, namely
Sweden's. In 1999, MacKinnon and Dworkin proposed to criminalize the buyer.11 The
legal response to prostitution, in Sweden, is to criminalize those who buy and those who
sell women, but not the women. This is law against sex discrimination, in stark contrast
to, for example, German law of sex work, since the Swedish law targets dominant and
privileged actors and takes note of the sexualized inequalities on the ground.
Then, the overall claim that equality should be interpreted as a substantive right,
rather than a symmetrical exercise in more or less rational differentiation, made it to
Canada, at least at some point in time. The Canadian Supreme Court interpreted what,
the then new (entered into force in 1985), section 15 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights in Canada to mean substantive equality in Andrews v. Law Society of British
Columbia.12 Behind it was the strategic activity of LEAF, in which MacKinnon was
involved as member of the National Legal Committee following a talk on "making sex
equality real," and others, including one on the interpretation of a human rights statute to
recognize systemic discrimination in 1987.13 Again, we see NGOs and courts pick up a
legal idea, and again, we need to conceptualize not only why that happens, but also take
into account that something may happen to travelling ideas which was not intended
EUROPEAN UNION: THE NEW FEMINIST CHALLENGE 51, 51 (R. Amy Elman ed., 1996). The German draft law
is published as Susanne Baer & Vera Slupik, Entwurf eines Gesetzes gegen Pornographie, 21 KRITISCHE
JUSTIz 171, 171-81 (1988).
10. "Doing gender" is a concept to describe the micropolitics of gendering, developed in ethnological
studies. It can be transferred to law in that it targets the practices of engendering people rather than gender as a
fact people act out or not.
11. Other examples may be Norway, Iceland, the United Kingdom, South Africa, and possibly Namibia.
For a sex discrimination analysis of prostitution, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, in
WOMEN'S LivEs - MEN'S LAWS, supra note 4, at 151.
12. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.).
13. See McIntyre, supra note 7.
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initially, or, influenced by the original source or initial actor. MacKinnon stopped
working in Canada years ago, and things developed not on their own, but without her
doings. So neither can legal success be attributed to one person alone, although the work
of individuals must be recognized regarding its impact, nor can a problematic legal
development be attributed to an initial success in court or parliament.
Currently, the claim exists that women are, indeed, human, as MacKinnon has put
it. 14 Here, a legal idea developed in U.S. law is applied on another level of law, namely
human rights and humanitarian law. Somewhat in between, the concept of rape as a
crime in war and as sex discrimination has been litigated in a national court, under the
U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act,15 which was based on work in Bosnia and Croatia, with
local as well as international activist groups.16 Then, the issue moved to international
law. MacKinnon was active on the level of the United Nations, with Madeline Albright
and others, in constructing the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia in 1993, officially created to address sexual abuse as a war crime. Then, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established in 1994, actually used a radical
feminist analysis to analyze rape in war. 17 Finally, the International Criminal Court
works on the basis of the 1998 Rome Statute defining rape and addresses the situation
of victims of sexual abuse in its Rules of Procedure and Evidence.1 9 Here, the travelling
14. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN? AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
DIALOGUES (2006) (this is the question which serves as the title of the book).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
16. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 232 (2d Cir. 1995), rehearing denied, 74 F.3d 377, 378 (2d Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996). Since 2001, MacKinnon is co-director of the Lawyers Alliance for
Women (LAW) Project, an initiative of Equality Now, the U.S. based NGO she collaborates with
internationally.
17. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Defining Rape Internationally: A Comment on Akayesu, 44 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 940 (2006) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Defining Rape Internationally] (regarding the definition
of rape in the ICTR and a discussion of developments from there). See also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Are
Women Human? in REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A FIFTIETH
ANNIVERSARY ANTHOLOGY 171, 171-72 (Barend van der Heijden & Bahia Tahzib-Lie eds., 1998) (discussing
the definition of women under the Declaration of Human Rights).
18. The definition of rape in the International Criminal Court Statute reads: "The perpetrator invaded the
body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of
the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other
part of the body." And: "The invasion was committed by force, or by the threat of force or coercion, such as
that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such
person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed
against a person incapable of giving genuine consent." Preparatory Commission for the Int'l Criminal Court,
Report of the Preparatory Commission for the Int'l. Criminal Court Part II: Finalized Draft Text of the
Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(g)-1, PCNICC/2000/l/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000).
19. Rule 16(1)(d) obliges the registry: "Taking gender-sensitive measures to facilitate the participation of
victims of sexual violence at all stages of the proceedings." International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, rule 16(l)(d), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (2000), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/iccrulesofprocedure.htm. Rule 17 calls on the Victims and Witnesses
Unit to "[make] available to the Court and the parties training in issues of trauma, sexual violence, security and
confidentiality." Id. at rule 17(2)(a)(iv). Rule 70 states the "Principles of Evidence in Cases of Sexual
Violence":
In cases of sexual violence, the Court shall be guided by and, where appropriate, apply the
following principles: (a) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim
where force, threat of force, coercion or taking advantage of a coercive environment undermined the
victim's ability to give voluntary and genuine consent; (b) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of
any words or conduct of a victim where the victim is incapable of giving genuine consent; (c)
Consent cannot be inferred by reason of the silence of, or lack of resistance by, a victim to the
64 Vol. 46:59
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takes a different form since MacKinnon has been visibly empowered as a Special
Advisor to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court beginning in late 2008.
Now how does all of this happen, and what allows it to happen, exactly?
MODES OF TRAVELLING
How should we understand and tell the stories of such itineraries? Which
concepts do we have at our disposal to analyze how law moves across borders? I will
briefly discuss some ideas from comparative legal studies to then turn to norm diffusion
theories.
Transplants?
In comparative legal studies, Alan Watson developed the concept of
transplantation, of "legal transplants."20 He discussed it as a particularly productive
source of legal development, somewhat grounded in the evolutionary concept of law
promulgated by German jurist von Savigny much earlier in the nineteenth century.
Today, and more generally, it is used to describe how one legal concept moves to another
legal context: it is "transplanted." But the concept cannot be applied to many legal
journeys. For example, when we proposed a civil rights law against pornography in
Germany in 1988, we used the ordinance Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin
had drafted in the United States and passed it on to political parties in the German
Federal Parliament, which did, in fact, not agree with us, and the draft never went into
effect as law.21 According to transplantation theory, there was nothing to transplant since
the ordinance was not U.S. law at the time. But even if we consider drafts and proposals
as objects of transplantation, a concept of legal travels must account for severe
modifications, such as the specific type of translation which takes place in such settings.
We used the U.S. ordinance, but we actually wrote another one to better account for the
structure of German civil law. We took the legal idea that pornography is not a question
of taste or morals, but a violation of civil rights, but needed to say this, legally, in
German.
The German proposal failed, like its U.S. inspiration, and in transplantation terms,
this is a case of rejection. This is also not surprising since, true to the medical metaphor,
alleged sexual violence; (d) Credibility, character or predisposition to sexual availability of a victim
or witness cannot be inferred by reason of the sexual nature of the prior or subsequent conduct of a
victim or witness. Id. at rule 70.
Rule 71 covers "Evidence of Other Sexual Conduct": "In the light of the definition and nature of the crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court, . . . a Chamber shall not admit evidence of the prior or subsequent sexual
conduct of a victim or witness." Id. at rule 71.
20. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAw (1993). See also
Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163
(2003) (a study on the effect of transplant laws); Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of 'Legal Transplants, ' 4
MAASTRICHT J. EuR. & COMP. L. Ill (1997) (postmodem perspective of legal transplants); see generally Jorg
Fedtke, Legal Transplants, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 434-37 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2006).
21. Note that in Minneapolis the ordinance passed in a democratic process and was vetoed by elites; while
in Germany, it was rejected by a parliamentary majority (and maybe by elites). It is unclear what "the people"
thought, but it is plausible to assume that exposure to the realities of pornography make people accept a need of
protection against the violence involved, which is exactly what the law focuses on.
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transplants are not always successful. The receiving body may ultimately reject that
transplant. But with this either/or logic, the metaphor does not encompass all there is to
such a process and its effects. Conceptually, there are at least three aspects that force us
to eventually leave transplantation to medicine.
First, the idea of the transplant has a narrow focus on law, and travelling ideas may
affect politics, social interaction, and framing too.22 These effects inspire studies of norm
diffusion, which I will turn to below.
Second, the medical metaphor is not taken seriously enough. In transplantation
medicine, it is well known that all receiving bodies reject the transplant initially, and that
one has to dedicate much care to allow a transplant to work. So in the German example
of the travels of MacKinnon's anti-pornography ordinance, it was not simply rejection,
but there was not enough post-care work done in Germany to prevent rejection. An anti-
pornography civil rights bill in Germany is not just an attempt to reframe pornography as
an inequality. It was, and still is, an attempt to address harm with tort law. At the time,
courts struggled with the very idea of adjudicating damages for immaterial harm, which
has eventually been legislated in a modification of the civil code. At the time, there was
no explicit civil law legislation against discrimination, different from, say, Britain, or for
that matter, the United States. There was only criminal law against hate speech, which
was understood to be a "never again" to combat the "Auschwitz lie" after the Holocaust,
and anti-Semitism, and which was not designed to address sexism or racism and sexism
combined. Thus, much more was needed to allow the anti-pornography civil rights
ordinance to travel than just a focus on pornography as sexist harm. As such, legal
transplants require a significant amount of care.
Third, the concept of transplantation presupposes distinct bodies. For the longest
time we came to think of law as such a distinct national item, and the metaphor of
transplantation is based on that. Simultaneously, in comparative legal studies, travelling
concepts have long been thought of as rather bad ideas, exactly because law was
perceived as utterly national in what is now often called a Westphalian model. 23 It is this
tradition of the nation-state, as a legal entity, and sovereign in its law-making powers,
that informs the metaphor of transplants and resists the notion of travelling for law. This
tradition of national law, proud to be distinct from any other, eventually also inspired the
notion of "legal families," which has informed much comparative work in the past. But
the idea of "families" resembles the concept of "race" in that both are imaginations of
essential similarities, which in fact do not exist. Therefore, the transplantation metaphor
is somewhat flawed in itself.
22. The concept of frames goes back to Erving Goffiman, and was used in David A. Snow et al., Frame
Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation, 51 AM. Soc. REv. 464 (1986), and in
relation to "norms" in FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS OF
PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS (1989), and
AUDIE KLOTZ, NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID (1995).
23. See Jay Reding, The End of the Westphalian Model?, JAYREDING.COM (Feb. 18, 2008),
http://jayreding.com/archives/2008/02/18/the-end-of-the-westphalian-model/.
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Transnational flow?
Today, the world has been regionalized and globalized. The nation-state is deeply
entangled with others, and is not as distinct a body anymore. This does not mean that the
nation-state and sovereignty have vanished. They are around and fare rather well indeed
- better than many would have thought after the financial crisis of the early twenty-first
century, which made people rethink privatization and other libertarian ideas. Yet today, it
is a nation-state deeply embedded, entangled in larger contexts, with the region and the
world. Some do resist that notion, and insist on a dream of originality or "strict
constructivism," but they are a very small minority and easily identifiable with a specific
and particularistic political agenda.24 In fact, the nation-state, and its law, are, today,
transnationalized. The state acts in relation to other states as well as to transnational,
regional, and international actors, as do law-makers, including the courts, and private
parties in contracts, choice of legal procedure, and the like.
Thus, some argue, we indeed live with travelling ideas in law for rather practical
reasons, but may not have fully recognized this yet. There is international law
permeating much national legal practice, be it via trade agreements (as in NAFTA) or via
international tax treaties or via copyright rules. But maybe more importantly, there is
transnational legal practice which calls upon lawyers to know and apply laws from all
around the world, or invent their own lex mercatoria.25 Does this mean we now have to
take travelling of legal ideas for granted, and my enquiry comes to an end?
Regarding laws governing commercial transaction, there is certainly that
transnational trend.26 So note that we - people living in prosperous nations - tend to
like and accept economic transnational law from which we profit. Also note that serious
legitimacy concerns exist regarding these developments, which are not raised often
enough, and are usually not seen as scandalous deviations from our standards. Put
differently, transnational law firm practice does not face the need of, or a serious call for,
democratic procedures.
But there is another type of law out there. This other type of transnational and
international law does and is indeed officially meant to permeate legal practice, namely
human rights. Note that these laws are not particularly liked, at least by those in power
and on the privileged side - those who have something to lose. Also note that this type
of law is subjected to legitimacy challenges as a default position. So we accept
transnational legal spheres when it comes to business, but there is a strong trend to reject
24. This obviously refers to the methodological stance of strict originalism (most prominently held by
Justice Scalia on the U.S. Supreme Court), which resists the notion of travelling law. However, it seems to be
based in a strong federalist belief, and is utterly flawed with an either naive or ideological emphasis on a
clearly identifiable intent of framers, beyond its national chauvinism. Different from that, the majority of
constitutional courts, scholars, and even constitution-making bodies situate national law in more or less explicit
terms in a global context. See generally NORMAN DORSEN, MICHEL ROSENFELD, ANDRAS SAJO & SUSANNE
BAER, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2010).
25. Today, the concept is exposed in TIBOR VARADY, JOHN J. BARCEL6 III & ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 901 (4th ed. 2009). See also
Gunther Teubner, 'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A
STATE 8-14 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997) (discussion of lex mercatoria); Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law,
in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 740-2 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2006).
26. Iam grateful to Gerald Torres for reminding me of this.
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transnational law when it comes to our daily lives, fundamental needs, or individual
safety.
Overall, our world is not transnationalized. Rather, it is fragmented into
transnationalized areas, like trade, and other more contested spheres, like human rather
than primarily commercial interaction, addressed by human rights. So it is also not
transnationalism we are looking at when legal ideas travel, but something else.
Migration?
In more recent comparative constitutional studies, Sujit Choudry has proposed the
metaphor of migration. 2 7 This is a tempting metaphor indeed. It allows us to think about
the processes in which legal ideas are communicated, and eventually taken up in a place
where they did not originate. Thus, it is beyond the either/or-logic of a transplant, takes
the entangled state of affairs into account, and is compatible with globalization. In
addition, I suggest that the metaphor of migration allows us to think about formal,
official, legitimate forms as well as informal, illegal forms of mobility. What happens if
we apply this to law, and do so in the case of MacKinnon's concept of substantive
equality?
Official migration of law occurs in the EU, when secondary EU legislation is
transposed into national law by EU member states. This type of migration requires
power, or at least empowerment. Another example may be South African constitutional
law, where Art. 39 sec. I of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) constitution states that
the courts, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, "b. must consider international law; and
c. may consider foreign law." 28 Also, the European Court of Human Rights is known for
a doctrine which requires the Court to take the common constitutional traditions of all
contracting states into account, and the EU states that principle in Art. 6 of the new
treaty. 29
In our case at hand, MacKinnon's work is empowered by her status as Special
Rapporteur to the International Criminal Court. However, this seems more like an
exception than the rule. Generally, migration which is informal, unofficial, or at least not
immediately legitimate seems to be much more widespread. You may imagine this to
happen when a legal idea stays longer than a visa allows, or travels below a passenger
seat, or hidden in some truck or other dark space where border control does not find it.
You may think of smuggling too. I actually think some of MacKinnon's work has snuck
into several contexts that way. But how and why does that work exactly? The metaphor
of migration does not fully answer this.
27. See Sujit Choudhry, Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law, in THE
MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006).
28. S. Afr. Const. art. XXXIX § 11996.
29. The Treaty on European Union art. 6, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 OJ. (C321)("1. The Union is founded on the
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law,
principles which are common to the Member States. 2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed
in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member
States, as general principles of Community law. 3. The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member
States. 4. The Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its
policies.").
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Norm diffusion in "spirals of contestation"
To explain how norms travel, some political scientists, namely Kathryn Sikkink
and Thomas Risse, have developed a theory of "spirals of contestation." 30 They observe
that norms, different from rules, travel, and they claim that there are specific conditions
for legal norms to stay in a given domestic area called a process of "socialization." Norm
diffusion, according to Risse and Sikkink, occurs in spirals oscillating between rejection
and affirmation, endorsement and resistance, and eventually results in a situation in
which a norm is taken in, internalized by a given society, and "socialized." 3 1
Clearly, a governance perspective informs this concept in that it evaluates
interaction among a set of actors, namely the state as well as NGOs,32 and some
30. They study what human rights do in the world "because international human rights norms challenge
state rule over society and national sovereignty, any impact on domestic change would be counter-intuitive"
not necessarily because they are institutionalized or because they are contested. Thomas Risse & Kathryn
Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices, Introduction in THE
POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 1, 1-38 (Thomas Risse, Stephen
C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 1999). See also INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIALIZATION IN
EUROPE (Jeffrey T. Checkel ed., 2007) (for a different developed model); Martha Finnemore & Kathryn
Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT'L. ORG. FOUND. 887 (1998) (for a review
of the field).
31. Risse & Sikkink, supra note 30, at 11-12, 17-35. According to them, human rights, 1) put bad states on
the international agenda and remind good states of their liberalism, 2) mobilize domestic opposition, and 3)
create pressure from up and down. This then inspires three processes: First, instrumental adaptation and
strategic bargaining and/or moral consciousness-raising, argumentation, dialogue, persuasion; second,
institutionalization and habitualization; and third, an internalization of norms. All of this happens in a spiral
development with various boomerangs going back and forth between society, state, and inter/transnational
networks, in which the state offers repression, denial, tactical concessions, adopts prescriptions, or shows rule-
consistent behavior. Id. Transnational NGO networks institutionalize human rights by using "soft power,"
constructing the state and women-as-citizens, either empowered or silenced, in the process. To understand this,
feminism focuses on notions of the private and the state that fails to act there, which reveals the limits of a
legalistic approach. For a study of human rights politics, see Karen Brown Thompson, Women's Rights are
Human Rights, in RESTRUCTURING WORLD POLITICS: TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, NETWORKS,
AND NORMS 96, 96-122 (Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 2002) (for a study of
human rights politics). Others study whether norms are formally accepted and use this as an indicator of sex
equality based on several case studies on the effect of CEDAW. See Mark M. Gray, Miki Caul Kittilson &
Wayne Sandholtz, Women and Globalization: A Study of 180 Countries, 1975-2000, 60 INT'L ORG. FOUND.
293, 311-27 (2006). See also Anita M. Weiss, Interpreting Islam and Women's Rights: Implementing CEDAW
in Pakistan, 18 INT'L SOC. 581 (2003) (a case study on Pakistan); Alison Brysk, Global Good Samaritans?
Human Rights Foreign Policy in Costa Rica, 11 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 445 (2005) (a case study on Costa
Rica). However, note there are signs that authoritarian regimes which do not fear a critical civil society to take
them up on ratifying international law may be as fast as democratic regimes to sign treaties like CEDAW. See
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Kiyoteru Tsutsui & John W. Meyer, International Human Rights Law and the
Politics of Legitimation: Repressive States and Human Rights Treaties, 23 INT'L Soc. 115, 119 (2008). The
MUSE project studied twenty states based on a more holistic approach. See generally CHRISTOF HEYNS &
FRANS VIuOEN, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES ON THE DOMESTIC LEVEL
(2002); BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS
(2009); see also Steven C. Poe, Dierdre Wendel-Blunt & Karl Ho, Global Patterns in the Achievement of
Women's Human Rights to Equality, 19 HuM. RTS. Q. 813, 815 (1997) (proposing two indicators to measure
impact of CEDAW).
32. See CAROLINE E. SCHWITTER MARSIAJ, THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL NGOS IN THE GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: CHALLENGING THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 20-27 (2004) (discusses
functions of NGOs to be: information, education, advocacy, standard-setting, and linking local with global).
NGO is defined in U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Consultative Relationship Between the United
Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations, res 1996/31 (July 25, 1996), and in, European Convention on
the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-Governmental Organisations, art. 1, Apr. 24,
1986, E.T.S. No. 124. A very particular type of NGO is LEAF in Canada. See McIntyre, supra note 7. Another
example, enabling work against genocide, is Equality Now, mentioned above, active in supporting Bosnian
women. This is the background for the case of Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), an
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individuals. 33 This rests on work by Keck and Sikkink on transnational actor networks
34(TANs). Indeed, there would not be much travelling of MacKinnon's ideas, or other
ideas of a feminist, critical race, queer, or similar nature without such actors, namely
women's movements and antiracist movements and queer movements, sometimes
organized, sometimes not, around the world, as mentioned in the short case studies
above. Some of these movements even focus on institutional progress, like the
establishment of the War Crime Tribunals by the U.N. with a mandate to address sexual
abuse. For example, there was a Women's Caucus formed in 1997 and supported by
NGOs and women's organizations from around the world, then succeeded by the
Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice, a transnational NGO now based near the
International Criminal Court. This may also remind us of the fact that movements or
TANs not only fight with states or power, but also fight among themselves, which, at
times, places norms to bitter, sometimes hostile and ill-founded, stereotyping and
polarizing contestation. Thus, it is never just MacKinnon's idea that travels, but it is an
idea which she may bring up, articulate and advocate, and that people organized in
movements, then take up, modify (not always to the better), move it, turn it into part of
an "-ism" (or against it), a law (or into a critique of it), or their politics (or opposition).
In addition, according to the spirals model, any travelling of legal ideas needs
structures in the sense of social and discursive patterns, both institutional and symbolic,
to take hold. In particular, Myra Marx Ferree has reminded us of the necessary
"institutional anchors" of transnational feminist discursive politics. 35 Thus, ideas of
substantive equality travel when there are institutions in which to discuss them - from
parliaments to courts to university symposiums or to the streets, if one considers that
public space an institution as well. Additionally, legal ideas travel when they make sense
in a symbolic order - by using known terms or building on established meanings. For
example, in Canada, dominance theory did not just take hold because it is good theory,
but also because there were, at the time, institutions willing to read and discuss it, and
because there was a jurisprudence and politics which offered the pieces which
unenforced landmark decision to recognize sexual atrocities as genocide in a domestic tort claim abroad.
33. It is unclear how important individual stances are since there are no micro level studies to date. Note
that the common law tradition tends to label jurisprudence personally (e.g., the Dixon court, the Brennan court,
etc.). In studies of transnational politics, some use Pierre Bourdieu's notion of personal "capital" as power in
certain fields.
34. Advocacy networks do form "structured and structuring" epistemic communities in which they share
beliefs and values, different from instrumental networks like corporations or idealist networks like science,
believe in activist democracy and strategize accordingly, transcending the boundaries of nation-states, and
distribute resources (information, but also reputational capital, money), to change the "frames" of a debate.
MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETwORKs IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 4, 30 (1998). They do transnational work because national channels may be blocked
to produce a "boomerang pattern" via intergovernmental organizations. One example is politics against genital
mutilation of girls and women, named FGM in a campaign in 1974 to scandalize a practice known to
anthropologists and medical experts. Id. at 20. Keck and Sikkink note that issues are often bodily harm to
vulnerable individuals, as in anti-slavery movements, id. at 41-51, foot binding and circumcision of women in
China or Kenya, id. at 59-72, violence against women, id. at 165-98. See generally FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE:
WOMEN'S STRATEGIES FROM AROUND THE WORLD (Margaret Schuler ed., 1992) (discussing violence);
Dorothy E. McBride & Amy G. Mazur, Measuring Feminist Mobilization: Cross-National Convergences and
Transnational Networks in Western Europe, in GLOBAL FEMINISM: TRANSNATIONAL WOMEN'S ACTIVISM,
ORGANIZING, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 219,219-40 (Myra Marx Ferree & Aili Mari Tripp eds., 2006).
35. Myra Marx Ferree, Resonance and Radicalism: Feminist Framing in the Abortion Debates of the
United States and Germany, 109 AM. J. Soc. 304, 339 (2003).
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dominance theory then puts together.36 Similarly, MacKinnon did build her approach to
international law against sexual abuse upon cites from the Nuremberg trials. Often, such
use of building blocks is treated as a congruence or salience requirement, or as
compliance. Instead, scholars attentive to legal pluralism and law from below have
rightly emphasized that congruence building is a process, and that compliance may look
very different for different actors involved. 37 Regarding substantive sex equality and the
contexts in which it travelled described above, social and legal and institutional schemes,
however, differ rather widely. In addition, radical ideas collide with established norms
and ruling institutions much more often than mesh with them. Therefore, congruence
cannot fully explain why an idea like substantive equality does or does not take hold.
Therefore, the study of MacKinnon's work urges us to ask who exactly shall agree
upon and construct congruence, and what kind of collision rather than congruence
impacts travelling.38 To name what frequently happens to her ideas: Does it stop norm
diffusion if an idea is labelled "American," in contexts and at times in which the United
States has the reputation of an aggressive colonizer? 39 Does the conservative defamation
strategy of "political correctness" work, where, and why? Does it help or hinder the
travelling of an idea if it is proposed by a professor, or a lawyer, by invitation of a
feminist group, or a bureaucracy, and in what context? When is an idea blocked by a
particular version of a "cultural defense" to shield a country or other unit from sex
equality demands? For now, it seems plausible to argue that legal concepts travel when,
like that developed by MacKinnon to address sexual violence, they give words to
experiences out there, allow some people - namely: women of all varieties to articulate
the world as they experience it, thus building congruence with lives, rather than just with
the law.40 It seems to be important that the world, rather than just the law, as she found
it, which is what Ann Scales called MacKinnon's concepts,41 can be transformed into a
world as someone knows it. This illustrates, very much in line with MacKinnon's
epistemological starting point of law forming a (sexist) ontology of sorts,42 that
experience-driven theory matters,43 but it may also add to our concept of norm diffusion
36. See McIntyre, supra note 7.
37. See Amitav Acharya, How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional
Change in Asian Regionalism, 58 INT'L. ORG. FOUND. 239, 243 (2004); Robert Howse & Ruti Teitel, Beyond
Compliance: Rethinking Why International Law Really Matters, I GLOBAL POL'Y. 127, 130 (2010). See also
SONIA CARDENAS, CONFLICT AND COMPLIANCE: STATE RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
PRESSURE 1-11 (2007). See generally Andrew P. Cortell & James W. Davis, Jr., Understanding the Domestic
Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda, 2 INT'L STUD. REv. 65 (2000) (discussing salience);
Xinyuan Dai, Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism, 59 INT'L ORG. FOUND. 363 (2005)
(discussing an approach based on game theory).
38. There is also the question of what kind of dynamic makes human rights work in domestic contexts. See
Jonas Tallberg, Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union, 56 INT'L ORG.
FOUND. 609, 609-43 (2002) (arguing that combination works best).
39. See Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on US. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance, 10
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 383 (2003).
40. Sometimes, this resonance cannot be named, or explicitly described in adequate terms. See Jo Ann
Palchak, A Legal Room of One 's Own, 46 TULSA L. REv. 11.
41. See Anne Scales, The World As She Found It, 46 TULSA L. REv. 7 (2011).
42. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 3-12 (1989) [hereinafter
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE].
43. See Karima Bennoune, Why Does it Matter if Women are Human?: Catharine MacKinnon's
Contributions to International Law, 46 TULSA L. REv. 107.
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that there needs to be a specific quality to the legal idea to travel.
According to the spirals model of norm diffusion, and the modifications already
mentioned, this is about it. When institutions do not take up travelling ideas,
socialization does not happen. Others have already shown that actors are not the whole
story, but that the political winds must blow for change as well. In rule of law-projects,
the political climate may even be more important than the actors involved. 44 Still others
have argued that the spiral model may be overly Northern and elitist, and may fail when
applied to the Global South. 45 In my German example of law against pornography, this
would mean the effort to fight pornography by means of law failed again. But this would
also lose sight of all the effects on women's movements, on politicians, on scholars, and
on other people. Therefore, I propose to further investigate that other component to our
understanding of norm diffusion - the very quality of the legal idea, beyond the
processes around it.
THE QUALITY FACTOR IN NORM DIFFUSION
When law travels, the distinct quality of a legal idea is an important factor. By
quality, I do not mean a value judgment, as in a good idea or a bad idea. Instead, the
travelling quality of a legal idea is, I suggest, first its potential to inscribe itself into
broader legal traditions, and second its potential to radically alter the conceptual
underpinnings of exactly that tradition. I have already mentioned that substantive
equality, as a radical idea, is not likely to find congruence or salience on site, in law, but
that MacKinnon's ideas find salience in life, particularly the diverse experiences of
women with abuse. This already hints at a reconfiguration of the public/private split.
However, there is more to that part of the story.
The analysis of MacKinnon-style travelling of "equality thinking" illustrates the
relevance of a particular legal quality of a norm to diffuse. It travels because people and
institutions take it up. It also travels because there is what we call global communication,
despite its elitism and selectivity. But it also travels because of the quality of that very
idea. MacKinnon's work is, I suggest, not just some other very interesting and very smart
idea of how to think about equality. This is certainly what it is. But there is also a
specific way of arguing it, namely: legal, and a specific content that is argued, namely:
the private as public.
THE FACTOR OF LEGALISM IN NORM DIFFUSION
First, MacKinnon's arguments are utterly legal. 4 6 In her scholarship, law is a rather
complex phenomenon: a "crack in the wall," a propaganda technique, an ontology,
44. Case studies are collected in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE
(Thomas Carothers ed., 2006). In particular, see Wade Channell, Lessons Not Learned About Legal Reform, in
PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD 137, 137-60 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006); Thomas Carothers, Steps
Toward Knowledge, supra at 327-37.
45. See Laura K. Landolt, (Mis)constructing the Third World? Constructivist Analysis of Norm Diffision,
25 THIRD WORLD Q. 579, 579-91 (2004) (featuring a review of work by Risse, Sikkink, Ropp, and others).
46. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Law in the Everday Ltfe of Women, in WOMEN'S LIVES - MEN'S
LAWS, supra note 4, at 32-43; see also TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 42, at 161-65
(describing the maleness of the state).
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politics, words but not just words. But in her legal concepts, she exercises the law. So
logical. So meticulously based on the law, as norm and jurisprudence. Dissecting, as a
good legal argument, each and every detail of any legal aspect relevant to the discussion.
Engaging, as a grand legal argument, the core ideas - namely, equality, in liberal and
some egalitarian traditions of fundamental rights - and gently reframing equality, in
some ways, as a liberty interest.4 7 But even in legalese, MacKinnon's legal theory of
equality is deeply political in that it exposes the very politics of mainstream
interpretation in each and every detail. In a U.S. context, this renders it "critical," 4 8 in the
sense of reflexive. What really happens is that law is taken seriously as doing life. Put
differently, MacKinnon takes up the classics since she discusses Aristotle (to reject him)
and the mainstream tradition of similarity tests (to reject it), but also engages in a
discourse well-known in that it "simply" (as MacKinnon often calls it) claims the basics,
again and again and again, which is: equality for women too. The arguments are case
oriented and doctrinally flawless, with just a different content. This makes it very
attractive to judges and other people who tend to like fine legal arguments. It also makes
it very unattractive to some theorists who despise this as overly rigid (instead of
rigorous). I have argued elsewhere that this may not only confuse law and other spheres
of politics, but it may also underestimate the inequality in politics not governed by law.49
To develop arguments which inform a decision, and not ambivalence, is part of doing
legal theory and law, different from philosophy or literary studies or even social science.
It is also an element that renders this work, in political and theoretical terms, radical, as
in: targeting the roots of a problem. Culturally, this is read as harsh, or rigid, which is,
not at least, a stance traditionally associated with a male gaze. 50 But such qualities also
give an argument just the edge it needs to be taken up by legal minds, beyond "-isms."
Additionally, the work we look at here is not limited to doctrine and black letter
law. It is also visionary in its call for human rights and justice,51 or in arguments for
more precise laws to "simply" (as MacKinnon would label it) eliminate (not "reduce" or
47. This is particularly relevant in those legal systems that use structurally different tests for liberty rights
and for equality rights. Liberty can be violated, if an interference is not justified, e.g., proportionate, and
equality can be disregarded if it is wrongly assessed. See generally Susanne Baer, Dignity, Liberty, Equality: A
Fundamental Rights Triangle of Constitutionalism, 59 U. TORONTO L.J. 417 (2009).
48. This is the way Gerald Torres put it at the symposium. Gerald Torres, Sex Lex: Creating a Discourse,
46 TULSA. L. REv. 45. In political philosophy, "critical" should be associated with the Frankfurt School formed
by Horkheimer and Adomo after 1945, which is a particular version of critique. A key component is an anti-
identitarian stance, which also informs MacKinnon's work, despite the often-misleading critique which calls
her work "essentialist."
49. This is a critique of arguments by, among others, JUDITH BUTLER, EXcITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF
THE PERFORMATIVE (1997), and fully developed in Susanne Baer, Inexcitable Speech: Zum Rechtsverstlindnis
postmodernerfeministischer Positionen, in JUDITH BUTLER, EXcITABLE SPEECH KRITISCHE DIFFERENZEN 229
(1998). As an example, the CEDAW committee pursues a policy to "put the law in place" first, since there will
be no human rights for women without it. See Savitri Goonesekere, Universalizing Women's Human Rights
through CEDA W, in THE CIRCLE OF EMPOWERMENT 52, 56 (Hanna Beate Sch6pp-Schilling & Cees Flinterman
eds., 2007).
50. This informs stereotypes, which in turn inform scholarship evaluations of when women are caught
between rigidity (no sense of humor, not social, not nice, not a woman, a doomed to fail attempt to copy men)
and silence (nice, friendly, a woman). What I see as MacKinnon's stance is a focus, a relentless, somewhat
patient, yet always adequately angry position towards the world.
51. Lori Watson attempts to rework it for liberalism, following Rawls concept of political liberalism,
seeking fair consideration of diverse views. Lori Watson, Toward a Feminist Theory of Justice: Political
Liberalism and Feminist Method, 46 TULSA L. REv. 35.
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"minimize" but be radical) prostitution or pornography. The vision is mostly called
justice, "just human rights," or "straight-forward sex equality," as simple as that, and it
makes it attractive to lawmakers, useful in regulatory procedures. Again, it is such
arguments that give norms just the edge they need to travel.
Not to forget, MacKinnon takes "the classics" up in another way as well. Her work
starts with racism and focuses on sex, with attention paid to class, thus theorizing gender
as an intersectional materiality. As such, she reiterates the "classic," at least in 1970's
and 1980's U.S., as well as European, radical feminism, trio of race-class-gender. 5 2
Much of this part of her work, as Crenshaw shows, has not received attention or
recognition, for a variety of reasons, like the theorizing of the "White Woman." 53 Note
that MacKinnon has theorized "Heterosexual Woman" and "Class Position" as well, yet
neither has been read or recognized. In a genealogy attentive to seminal work on
heteronormativity by Adrienne Rich, MacKinnon deconstructs sex, which she describes
as the very sexualizing dynamics engendering people in ways which are utterly
heteronormative, and which can be read as always also entangled in race and class.54
This might be seen as another quality factor of a traveling legal idea. However, I will
now focus on the content factor of attacking the public-private dichotomy so
fundamental to law.
THE FACTOR OF RADICAL ALTERATION
Second then, and very much in line with the critique of law as such, MacKinnon's
ideas radically alter the public/private ideology, which informs the mainstream. This is
transforming law through the back door. It is not only theorizing from below, the ground,
real life, but it is a specific "below," that which was and often is labelled private. It is not
just some idea of substantive equality, but it is substantive equality in the anti-
public/private-ideology way which is at work here. This may also help to explain why
52. For example, Chandra Talpade Mohanty does not only not mention MacKinnon in her affirmative
genealogy of influential feminist work in the United States in the relevant period (but names TOWARDS A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE in the bibliography), but also limits her work to a vision of man-woman,
ethnicity, and class. See CHANDRA TALPADE MOHANTY, FEMINISM WITHOUT BORDERS: DECOLONIZING
THEORY, PRACTICING SOLIDARITY (2003). Her vision of feminism as "pro-sex and [pro]-woman," a statement
which can be seen as binary and heteronormative, although more nuanced concepts are exposed in the book. Id
at 3. Otherwise, Mohanty demonstrates the "colonialist move" in analysis of women's oppression in the Third
World. Id at 39. See also THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR xxiv,
53 (Cherrie Moraga & Gloria Anzaldfa eds., 1981) (The categories in question are "cultural, class, and
sexuality differences that divide women of color." However, a list used without further ado is "race,
colonialism, and capitalism," while it should be racism etc.)
53. Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What is a White Woman Anyway? 4 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 13 (1991) (and various reprints).
54. See TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 41, at 57-58 (rejecting what she calls
"naturalist" theories of heterosexuality to replace it with a theory of social, thus not inevitable, structure); id at
128 (analysing "sexuality as a social construct of male power . .. constitutive of the meaning of gender," in that
"it identifies sex - that is, the sexuality of dominance and submission - as crucial, as a fundamental, as on
some level definitive, in that process"); id at 129 ("The gender issue, in this analysis, becomes the issue of
what is taken to be "sexuality"); id at 130 (as "a pervasive dimension of social life," as "the dynamic of the
inequality of the sexes," in which gender is "a division of power"); id. at 131 (and "sexuality equals
heterosexuality equals the sexuality of (male) dominance and (female) submission"); id at 132 (with an
"ideological axis" around what is "[a]llowed/not allowed"); id. at 141 (and with homosexuality not free from a
"stake in this gendered sexual system"); id. at 142 ("The good news is, it is not biological."); id. at 28-9
(analyzing a class position, in discussing Marx, as derivative from father/husband).
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many attempt and fail to make substantive equality work, while substantive sex equality
has a particular bite.
The tradition, or ideology, which is under attack here is, as many have
demonstrated, 55 the idea of a protected private and a regulated public. This
public/private-distinction is in fact a gendered ideology in that it shields a subordinate
femininity and a public "good male citizen" - as in patriarchy and, in some ways,
colonialism and slavery - from the reach of law. 56 MacKinnon's work radically shatters
that distinction. When you follow her thoughts, there is nothing protected or homey and
cozy about the private, and there is nothing inherently just in public. This can be
illustrated in all the instances of travelling legal ideas: to conceptualize sexist and racist
and heteronormative harassment as a violation of fundamental rights in fact
problematizes behavior which has been considered private (i.e. sexual), personal (i.e.
color-blind), or just plain normal, desired, great fun etc. (i.e. heteronormative flirtation)
- and shatters the line drawn between that and the reach of law. To conceptualize
pornography, prostitution, and trafficking as not only a continuum of acts, but as a
violation of fundamental rights to liberty (free speech, contract, self determination), of
dignity and of equality in fact shatters that very same line: things, or acts, which are
called sex - and what image of sex is that? - are not intimate, or private, or somehow
complicated out of reach, but become political. Choice and agency become conditional
options whether applied to sex, marriage, or living abroad. And dignity is not a
moralistic value statement, but a call for mutual recognition. Finally, to conceptualize
mass rape in genocide, a strategy and a weapon which has been used for ages, as a
violation of fundamental human rights and humanitarian law as a sexist crime,5 7 does in
fact shatter that line again: It does render formerly private sexual activity (or excess,
depending)58 into an act for which one is publicly accountable. There may be something
private about sex, but according to this approach, it does not shield it from being a crime.
There is certainly something sexual in violence, but that does not allow us to forget about
the violent part just because it is couched in terms used for intimacy.
So this concept of substantive equality does not simply alter a theory. Rather, I
suggest, it carries a particular quality in that it targets inequalities along the
public/private divide. Targeting sexuality, racism, heteronormativity, and politics,
MacKinnon's approach digs deep into people's lives, not just their opinions or rhetoric
or scholarship or lawyering. It is substantive sex equality, meaning SEX equality, which
55. See, e.g., Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARv. L. REV. 1497, 1501 (1983).
56. Aida Hurtado, Relating to Privilege: Seduction and Rejection in the Subordination of White Women and
Women of Color, 14 SIGNS 833, 849-51 (1989) (discussing the public as personally political from the
perspective of women of color).
57. Again, Canadian decisions illustrate that MacKinnon did challenge the very basic notion of rape as
violence, turning it into sexual violence as discrimination. See R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (Can.); R. v.
Darrach, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443 (Can.) (A case in which Bill C-49 (1992) reintroduced equality and survived a
constitutional challenge). Again, the court did not simply transplant MacKinnon's ideas, but took elements in
the decision and omitted others, or implicitly used the analysis but did not explicitly account for equality as a
key right. In international law, where the Genocide Convention does not cover sex, the analysis of rape as
determining gender as a category in war makes all the difference, and inserts women into the protected classes.
58. There is a similar shift in the law against torture, moving from excess to strategy. See MACKINNON,
supra note 14, at 17-27; see also Bennoune, supra note 43.
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turns the formerly private (and gendered female) and the formerly public (gendered
male) into a continuum called human. It is not a concept in the abstract (thus not
legalistic in that sense) and not applied to anything, but, first and foremost, a concept
grounded in accounts of reality which applies substantive equality to sexual inequalities.
The idea traveling here is substantive equality in cases of sexist - often sexualizing race
- harassment, pornography, prostitution, trafficking, sexual abuse, and rape in
genocide. Legally, this list implies equality on the level of national statutory law,
primarily Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act, used against sexual harassment; national
constitutional law, namely the fundamental rights to equality and free speech in the U.S.
constitution; international law, namely human rights and the international law of crimes.
Thus, we see a move from harassment at work to rape as genocide, and a move from
national to international law. But this is not just development, it is a specific pattern.
What we see, beyond applications of a smart theory of substantive equality, is a
particular way of doing theory, with a particular target while doing it. What we really see
is a specific way to shatter the taboos and morals and laws which shield the private and
expose and question our very basic understandings of who we are and what we do, and
what we should not do, with and to each other. Experience otherwise exoticized,
orientalized, or othered, is brought home. 59 A move from harassment to rape, abuse in
marriage to war crimes, and pornography to torture, calls upon us to rethink where we
are in the matrixes of privilege and subordination.60 After all, MacKinnon's work is not
just another idea of equality, although she calls it equality theory, but also known as
dominance theory, or a concept of equality as a right against hierarchies, or
subordination. Its distinctive feature is its focus on harm, on violence, on what really
happens according to those victimized, the focus on clear and, for those with empathy,
painfully vivid descriptions of violence, particularly in cases in which it is called
sexuality. This theory does not develop a playful version of gender relations. Without
such positive images, it is rather unattractive to politicians, and to many academics, and
even to some people in emancipatory movements, and politically it is considered hard to
win votes by describing pain. By many, it is considered hard to do theory based on what
we see in the world. And to many, it is indeed painful to confront these issues head on,
so that it seems tempting and an almost rational move to escape. But it does expose the
private as a realm of justice requirements. Luckily, MacKinnon is not alone and not the
only one who thinks along these lines. But this quality factor of norm diffusion does
not cater to any comfort level.
59. Karima Bennoune discusses examples in MacKinnon's arguments On Torture. Bennoune, supra note
43
60. A similar point has been made by Gerald Torres. Torres, supra note 48.
61. See, e.g., Christine M. Chinkin, Women's International Tribunal on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery,
95 AM. J. INT'L L. 335 (2001) (describes the NGO tribunal to address sexual abuse when there was no official
procedure to use). See also Ursula A. O'Hare, Realizing Human Rights for Women, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 364, 366-
71 (1999) (the problem of the private). See generally INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES
(Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji eds., 2005); WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Kelly D.
Askin & Doris M. Koenig eds., 1999). For recent German works, see FRAUEN UND VOLKERRECHT, ZUR
EINWIRKUNG VON FRAUENRECHTEN UND FRAUENINTERESSEN AUF DAS VOLKERRECHT (Beate Rudolf Hrsg.,
2006); Gender und Internationales Recht (Andreas Zimmermann, Thomas Giegerich & Ursula Heinz Hrsg.,
2007). And the classic which defined the field, see HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE
BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS (2000).
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In doing this, her work uses a particular aesthetics, since it is sometimes
unnervingly and painfully clear about the harm of inequalities - no fuss, no cover ups,
no niceties. And since harm is very real to people, it allows many people to pick up on it.
The harm MacKinnon addresses is not just real but very well known to people beyond
public media reporting, beyond something happening elsewhere, and they are known on
much more than an intellectual or political or some other public level. An account of
these harms strikes a chord, personally, as private beings, in what many consider
intimate, first and foremost, indeed, recognizing women as human, but most scandalous,
provocative, problematic, regarding sex, as SEX.62
However, MacKinnon's work is not simply scandalizing victims, oppression, and
harm, because it does not use individual suffering to illustrate a theory. It is also not only
based on empirical data, although it uses a significant amount compared to most other
legal work. It employs "the logic of experience,"63 which is data often in the qualitative
form of narrative on harm, the silenced story, the yet unheard which informs that theory.
Again, through the back door, such theorizing shifts the ground. Substantive equality is
driven by specific types of data presented in as stark and precise a language as possible.
"To be clear: what is sexual is what gives a man an erection,"64 is but one of many lines
used in legal theory or a lawyer's brief. There are many other lines much crueler, violent,
and filled with pain. There, MacKinnon employs a specific aesthetics in describing harm
and ignoring taboo. This is not just writing about pain, it is also pain put to words. 65
As such, this norm exposes law and politics from below, driven by recognition of
social realities as needs law has to address, but also as experience which deserves
empathy, a more immediate reaction by each and every one of us. It turns a theory based
on experiences of injustice into a powerful claim to do something about it.66 There are
some problems, mostly due to MacKinnon's frequent use of the term "woman" or
"women" without further addition, which implies what some call "essentialism" and is
better described as groupism, in referring to a collective experience of women as a
homogenous entity.67 However, the foundational theoretical texts - like Towards a
Feminist Theory of the State - demonstrate that intersectionality, though not used in the
62. Marc Spindelman indentifies the challenge to "normal" understandings of sex as key to gay men's
unwillingness, if not outright rejection of sex equality arguments by MacKinnon. Marc Spindelman, Gay Men
and Sex Equality, 46 TULSA L. REV. 123 (2011). However, one may discuss whether the core point in
MacKinnon's theory is sex or rather the claim that women are indeed, human, as articulated in the book with
the title, and reread by Karima Bennoune. Bennoune, supra note 43.
63. This is the title of her own take on how ideas travel. Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Logic of
Experience: The Development of Sexual Harassment Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 813 (2002), reprinted in WOMEN'S
LIVES - MEN'S LAWS, supra note 4, at 162.
64. TOWARD A FEMImST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 42, at 137.
65. MacKinnon's lectures on pornography and harassment, published as CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
ONLY WORDS (1993), are an example of where she asks and forces readers to "imagine that women's reality is
real," while providing descriptions of such. Id. at 3, 7. As a translator of this work into German, I have often
felt (yet not acted upon) the urge to soften the wording. MacKinnon does not.
66. It may not be as important to name a theory and much more important to define the epistemological
starting point. This is why engaging deconstruction in these debates is important, since some theory labeled
deconstruction, as well as critical discourse analysis, set out to do exactly that. See Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Points Against Postmodernism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 687, 688-94 (2000).
67. See Susanne Baer, A Closer Look at Law: Human Rights as Multi-level Sites of Struggles over Multi-
dimensional Equality, 6 UTRECHT L. REv. 56, 58-61 (2010) (developing a critique of legal groupism, a
sociological concept developed by Rogers Brubaker).
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sense then proposed by Crenshaw, is present in that writing.68 MacKinnon's ideas travel
because she ties them to the ground of everyday people in all their diversity.
This leaves much room for others to attach their vision. Since MacKinnon's theory
is experience driven (she refers to consciousness-raising, a method to critical claim and
socially situate one's reality), 69 all kinds of theories of justice - distribution,
recognition, deliberation - may be attached. All grand philosophies of justice may kick
in, as long as they recognize the pain and vow to do something about it. Theory
grounded in pain calls for an inevitable response, but does not define the exact shape of
it. To agree with an analysis of sexualized inequalities does not force you to endorse a
specific political recipe to fight them. In addition, calls for such an equality cannot count
on political majorities or elites, because equality exactly challenges hegemonic, or in a
qualitative sense, majoritarian, normality, and privilege. This carries a risk in that such
theory may be misappropriated and abused by elites or majorities to actually discriminate
against some while equalizing others. One could argue that it is then not the idea
anymore that traveled. But I consider it important to also catch that variety of norm
diffusion. This is, again, exactly not what happened in Canada around pornography.70
There is also no data to date whether the Swedish law against prostitution does have
problematic effects on non-Swedish or non-EU women, although we know that the
German law against prostitution, which does not follow MacKinnon's approach but
endorses a sex-work-libertarian rationale, does foster racism. 7 1 However, legal ideas
seem to travel far even if they are radical alterations of majoritarian beliefs, but we need
to be very careful to attribute what happens later to them once they arrive.
How RADICAL NORMS DIFFUSE
MacKinnon's legal ideas travel, and they are not simply transplanted or trans-
nationalized or migrating. Rather, they diffuse as norms, relying on and driven by
transnational actor networks, diverse within themselves, use local anchors to take a hold,
bounce back and forth, rejected or accepted, and are eventually socialized. However, the
study of substantive equality on the road also shows that there is a quality factor in norm
diffusion. In this case, it is the specific legal anchors, in fundamental human rights and
the grand traditions of liberty and equality, gently modified. It is also the specific
deconstruction of a fundamental ideology of law, the public/private-distinction. And this
is done with a specific aesthetics in the use of data, grounding law in experience, thereby
relating to people's lives from the private realm, to make a public sex equality claim. As
68. TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 42, at 63 (Explicitly discussing the
"intersection" of class and sex in feminist work by Hartsock or Kollontai). Note that other feminist theorists
have not been criticized as essentialist, despite the same rhetoric, such as Mohanty, who argues "pro-sex and
[pro]-woman" If all else fails, one may call this strategic essentialism. MOHANTY, supra note 52, at 3.
69. See TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 42, at 83-105; MacKinnon, Defining Rape
Internationally, supra note 17, at 941-44 (Excellent examples of consciousness-raising can be found in
MacKinnons discussion of the meaning of "consent").
70. See Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium v. Canada, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (Can.).
71. The German government had to commission various studies to evaluate effects of the law which
legalized prostitution if it is based on the free will of the person involved, in 2002, based on a request from the
Federal Parliament. See PROF. DR. CORNELIA HELFFERICH, BMFSFJ, UNTERSUCHUNG, AUSWIRKUNGEN DES
PROSTITUTIONSGESETZES" ABSCHLUSSBERICHT (2007), available at http://www.bmfsfj.de/doku/prostitutionsg
esetz/pdf/gesamt.pdf (main report of the commission's findings) (German).
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such, radical ideas are always contested and collide rather than allow for congruence. In
traditional models of norm diffusion, this would limit traveling. With the additional
quality factor discussed here, we may be able to explain why legal ideas travel even if
they do not fit established laws or are not congruent with dominant beliefs.
If legal ideas have such specific quality, they seem to travel far even if they do not
make it into legal text or mainstream jurisprudence. To be sure, this is not a study of
impact or the real life effects of legal ideas. But in the cases studied above, law is taken
seriously as doing life, in some ways. Then, the German example of a draft civil rights
law against pornography has maybe not been a failure, but can be understood as a
specific type of norm diffusion, just like the Canadian equality jurisprudence or the
Swedish law against prostitution or the international criminal law against sexual abuse,
or gender crimes. Such attempts to change law, and eventually change lives, have not
been failures, but specifically successful attempts to diffuse several norms: the right to
substantive equality, a justice requirement in public as well as in private, and the norm
that all women are indeed human too.

